Introduction
Vietnam has been viewed, de facto, as a new market economy after its comprehensive economic reform in 1986 (usually referred to as Doi Moi), launched at the Sixth Communist Party's Congress. For more than 20 years in transformation, the birth of different types of markets has played a critical role in changing the national economic settings and cultivating a better functioning market mechanism in the society, at various levels. Since 2005, the Government has set the ambitious economic goal for the Vietnam to become an emerging new industrialized economy by 2020 or so. And, to achieve this, nobody could dispute the argument that a healthy and fastgrowing corporate sector would be the determining factor. Naturally, this sector will have to address a major constraint that oftentimes slows down their advance: capital shortage. The development of smooth-functioning capital markets has thus become an apparent medium-term objective for the country, although it is also where we can see most clearly the gap between desirability and achievability.
As to the development of financial markets in general, when studying the transformation set out by Doi Moi, economic and business researchers mostly focused on markets and sectors where impacts could be observed clearly and directly, such as the banking system, the foreign exchange market, and more recently, Vietnam's stock market. Thus, an increasing number of academic studies and insights on these market/sectors have been offered from 2004 to 2009 period, although the markets are still in its infancy and transformation is expected to take place for many more decades.
Nonetheless, an important part of the financial system, in general, and capital market, in particular, has not been studied adequately; that is the corporate bond market. The notion of corporate bond market that we use here refers to the entire system of (i) Products (different types of bond); (ii) Market participants, stakeholders (issuers, investors and regulators); and, (iii) Microstructure and mechanism for the market to function smoothly and the price discovery process to take place properly.
1.1.
Rationale A justification for the rest of our discussion needs to be given now. Before the existence of any equity market in Vietnam, debt markets had already been established. Debt financing has thus become a common financing vehicle through either formal bank credits, non-bank loans or informal credits. But it is also noteworthy that the debt capital market has been dominated by banks, of which state-owned commercial banks always outweigh the rest of the financial market (Vuong and Pham, 2009, pp. 136-137) .
This situation leads to a serious imbalance in allocating funds to different economic sectors, with the loser has always been private SMEs; 1 the sector that has constantly been labeled by both the government and economists as "the main engine for growth and safety cushion for the economy in transition." Now if we take into account the argument and all recognition of the critical importance of the SME sector, we must also admit that this growth driver has for long been under-powered, although entrepreneurs constantly try to seek both conventional and innovative financing options, both debt and equity. Corporate bonds, despite of their new concepts in the transitional economy of Vietnam, are likely driving up the bond market because of long-staying capital shortage, operational inefficiency of banking sector and financial system (Vuong: 1997a (Vuong: , 1997b (Vuong: , 1998a (Vuong: , and 2000 .
Although they are presented early in Vietnam's modern history, corporate bonds had never been a familiar financing option for the corporate sector. The instrument had not constituted a major portion of the debt market until very recently, after the capital market booming period of 2006-2007. In the post-Doi Moi period, 1986 -2009 , the Vietnamese emerging market economy has experienced a big surge in need of finance, for which domestic innovations in financial products have been brought about by a growing number of financial service firms and a fast-growing demand for different sorts of finance, debt, equity, quasi-equity, etc. However, still bank lending, and recently equity financing, have prevailed. The banking sector continues to have overshadowed the rest of the financial system of the country.
On the other hand, the recent booming of domestic capital markets, mainly seen through the asset price inflation in Vietnam's nascent stock market, now comprising of Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE or HSX, starting 2000) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX, starting 2005) , has mostly been meaningful to upper-stratum enterprises, now counting 500 listed firms in both exchanges.
Thus bank lending and equity finance in large scale (such as through capital market operations) have still been beyond the reach of smaller firms, while the majority of the corporate sector in Vietnam is classified as SME. It is noteworthy that since mid-1990s, the international donor community in Vietnam, a group of developed countries and multi-lateral institutions, has spearheaded the private SME sector as major source of sustainable growth for Vietnam in the long run. Different technical and financial assistance initiatives have been pursued, such as microfinance by the French AFD, women entrepreneurship financial support by the Belgian BTC, the MPDF program for supporting private sector enterprises managed by World Bank's IFC, and so on. However, these efforts and financial supports have, perhaps, not brought the most important result for the smaller private enterprise sector: a better functioning debt market.
Access to credits for SMEs continues to be a harsh reality. Alternatives to the overwhelming bank loans are limited. Financial leasing, once expected to become a term financing option, never grew to the necessary critical mass and became short-lived, despite early promising results in late 1990s (see Vuong 1997b). The difficulty in obtaining sufficient finance for growth, together with fastchanging business conditions made the honest private entrepreneurs more cautious in using debt finance, a reality that could be dated back in mid-1990s. SMEs also realize that both the absence of genuine venture capitalists, higher risk-tolerant investment funds and their management skills made it impossible for risky debts and risk equity to help them, even from investors and financiers known to have taste for risky investments (Vuong: 1997a (Vuong: , 1998a (Vuong: , and 1998b .
Even when equity financing by a wave of venture capital and conventional investment funds became more available, there still exist some critical issues. First, only a handful of startup firms in a few industries (such as ICT, high-profit services) proved to be successful in getting the funds. Second, the amount of funds is usually small, perhaps never close to real need of finance, thus becoming something symbolic only. Third, the question of commercial viability of these young firms is really difficult to answer, leading to a serious question of making business on such equity finance.
Naturally, the facts lead to our consideration of a rather conventional but still underdeveloped debt financing option in the economy --corporate bond. In light of the above, corporate bond should be not only the most promising, but in effect, sine qua non.
1.2.
Institutional Background Bonds, like modern paper money and stocks, were first introduced in Vietnam by the French colonialists, quite early in the modern economy of the contemporary Vietnam. Fig. 1 is an example of an early corporate bond issued by the French railroad firm -Compagnie des Chemins de Fer des Colonies Françaises -which was well known at the times and focused on developing railroad system in French colonial territories. In central planning regime, state-own enterprises (SOEs) fully dominated economic systems. Their capital needs meant those of government and should be financed by state budget. In the past, the central government of Vietnam at times raised funds for public expenditure, and in part to finance SOEs' demand for capital, by issuing the so-called "công trái" -an old-fashioned name for government bond. There is neither primary nor secondary market for these government bonds. Popularly, the bondholders -most of them were civil servants and bureaucrats -considered the purchase of "công trái" as formal contribution of several-day salary. These bondholders usually kept their holdings of bonds until maturity and were entitled to the face value of their holdings plus a pre-determined interest amount. As to non-state enterprises, low saving rate of people as well as absence of capital market prevented them from offering debt instruments to population.
The shift from the long-standing one-tiered banking system to two-tiered one -which was made happened from October 1, 1990 -was a milestone of Doi Moi. The market-oriented financial systems facilitated the process of separating corporate bonds from government bonds. Starting in mid-1990s, project bonds -debt instrument in a primitive form of corporate bond -appeared in the olden days of Vietnam's debt market. These bonds were issued by corporate entities having the need of raising external debt funding other than conventional bank loans. The funds were used for specific projects. At this stage, there was a grey area between government and corporate bonds which caused transitional characteristic. Most issues needed some kind of "guarantee" by the State, for example a payment ascertained by Vietnam Ministry of Finance. Local State Treasury authorized offices also participated in enhancing a smooth sale of bonds, proactively.
The change in nature of corporate bond issues in Table 1 is noticeable. In 1996, Refrigeration Engineering Enterprise (REE) issued a first convertible bond ever existent in the modern days of Vietnam. Vietnam International Leasing Company (VILC) issued fixed-rate book-entry bonds in 1999. The two issuers are usually thought of as private-sector firms, with REE Corp. being privatized in 1993 and VILC a joint-venture with a substantial equity holding by the Korean KILC. These issues were both unsecured and un-guaranteed. Their success in issuing corporate bonds has been remarkable due also to their high leverage at the time of issuing and their overwhelming access to bank loans, a common position that had been shared by a majority of private-sector firms. The nature of these unsecured bond issue reflected the first introduction of project financing concept into the economy of Vietnam, where only issuers' commercial viability and capacity of generating healthy cash flow in the future really count. Government-guaranteed debt issues has since gradually shifted toward commercial types and on the basis of creditworthiness.
In July 2000, the first stock market was established in Ho Chi Minh City, now HOSE (or HSX). Corporations since then have had an alternative for finance if equity is their choice. To a certain extent, the existence and vitality of a functioning stock market has induced better activeness of the bond and similar debt finances. Both the number of successful issues and liquidity of corporate bonds have shown significant improvements in recent years, although problems that hamper the development of the corporate bond market remain; the issue that we will deal with later on in this study.
1.3.
Legal and regulatory foundation The primary and secondary market transactions of corporate bonds in Vietnam have been governed by a regulatory framework, consisting of several legal documents which issuers and participants in the bond market must observe.
The Law on Securities 2006:
This highest regulatory document governing the listed and public corporate bond issues and trading was passed by the National Assembly of Vietnam, numbered No. 70/2006 /QH11 on June 29, 2006 . It stipulates that a firm that wishes to offer a sale of bond to the public must prepare a set of documents and follow disclosure requirements, prior to a formal appraisal/approval by the authorities (see Appendix C).
The stipulations focus on issuing firm's responsibilities of maintaining healthy financials and meeting its financial obligations to bondholders. Information and disclosure practices play a pivotal role to this end. Issuing firms must ensure the validity and completeness of data to bondholders even before the issue.
The financial accounts presented by such bond prospectus must comprise of audited balance sheets, statements of income and statements of cash flows. Annual financial reports must also be provided to bondholders.
The Enterprise Law 2005 paves a debt-issuing path for a shareholding firm by stating that they have rights to issue corporate bonds, convertible bonds and other types of bonds, in conformity to laws and the firm's Articles of Association. The Law prohibits enterprises from issuing bonds when they do not exhibit a sound financial position, having signals of either low debt servicing capability or below-average profitability. The Board of Directors has the right to determine details of the issue, but it will have to go back to present these to the firm's General Assembly of Shareholders in due course (see Appendix C).
In addition, the Decree 52/2006/ND-CP by the government of Vietnam stipulates details which enable eligible enterprises to issue their bonds, vanilla or with embedded options (convertibility with attached with rights). Financial and regulatory obligations pertaining to the issue rest with enterprises.
And finally, the Decision 07/2008/QD-NHNN by the State Bank of Vietnam governs particularly credit institutions operating in Vietnam, including state-run and joint-stock commercial banks, foreign bank branches, 100%-foreign-owned banks, and banking joint-ventures. This decision is devised for banks, on top of other legal documents, since banks are large financial firms that may have profound impacts on stability of the national financial system.
The above law and sub-law documents constitute a regulatory framework that enable the bond markets, formal or informal, to have been institutionalized and traded. In reality, they still contain unsolved issues but remain to be important cornerstones for the surge of the corporate bond market in Vietnam from 2005 to date. Interest rates have a particular influence of corporate bond market. The outlook for the corporate bond market means the outlook for interest rates generally (Conklin, 1961) . In short run, supply of funds is relatively much more stable than the demand which is affected sharply by performance of businesses. Thus, it is not uncommon that outlook for interest rates is expectation of general business results.
In recession times, business demands for funds decline and that trend would likely remain for a while due to recessionary tendencies. In contrast, the demand of low-risk or risk-free fixed income instrument, such as government bond, is rising since large deficit could build up quickly even in the absence of new spending programs. The decline of demand for fund in the market is easily offset. On one hand, the impact upon the long market is obvious if financed as much as possible through the intermediate and long terms. On the other hand, being financed largely through short terms and easy bank credit causes inflation surge.
Therefore, the common anti-recessionary monetary policy is to reduce interest rates, since low rates raise expectation of business performance. This, in turn, increases fund demand of corporate sector. Fiercer competition on the capital market results in increasing interest rates because more investors expect a subsequent recovery. Conklin (1961) In order to tighten money supply, the central bank in Vietnam increased base rate to 14% per annum causing the highest lending rate available in the marketplace to 21% p.a. In tight monetary scheme, we also recorded failures of government bond transaction on secondary market even at very deep discount, of up to 50%, for fully secured 10-year instrument, reflecting a serious liquidity problem. In this dark period, although only taking place for about two months, business psychology worsened in no time. In addition, illiquidity of government bond strongly indicated that there was no secondary transaction of corporate bonds because the latter would be much riskier than the former, especially when overnight interbank lending rate hiked to the phenomenal level of 40% p.a.
In a recent innovation, a debt issuer can also use a claw-back provision. This is a tool that enables the redemption of a specified fraction of the bond issue within a specified period at a predetermined price and with funds that must come from a subsequent equity offering. Goyal et al. (1998) In explaining the current degree of activeness of private bonds, we could refer to Alexander et al. (2000) , which hypothesized that that bonds issued by private firms (that is companies without publicly traded equity) should have lower volume. Although both public and private companies are requested to provide debt market's players with compulsory disclosure, investors' access to financial accounts of the former than appears somehow less challenging. In our case, the Vietnamese listed companies must report their business and financial performance quarterly. In addition, their stock prices are considered informative and useful statistics indicating the capacities of the debtors; and this partly explains the reality that a convertible condition is popular in successful corporate bond issues. Results of Alexander et al, however, do not totally agree with this. Mandatory FIPS (the Fixed Income Pricing System introduced by Nasdaq Stock Market in April 1994) issues of private equity firm trade as actively as securities of public firms. While equity is not available, more investors may prefer the debts of promising private firms than otherwise similar public firms, especially when they still have future chances to convert such debt into equity of the issuers.
As to liquidity of corporate bond secondary market, Alexander et al. (2000) examine the spread between institutional buy and sell prices. Bonds with higher trading volume are from larger issues and are seasoned less than two years because of lower transaction costs. They also assert that transparency improvement is highly important to liquidity. Several bond dealers would lose their informational advantage if disclosure becomes compulsory and standard, hence would be either unwilling to make markets or reluctant to provide quotes with low friction. These acts may reduce the market liquidity. However, Alexander et al find some issues trades fairly actively in FIPS. They, in addition, suggested that low-volume bonds are likely less liquid than high-volume bonds because of larger inventory of dealers which in turn increases transaction costs.
Looking into risk-return determinants of bond performance, Boardmand and McEnally (1981) decompose prices of corporate bonds into three elements: (i) the pure price of time, (ii) the default risk of the agency rating class to which the bond is assigned, and (iii) the unique risk and ancillary features of the bond itself. Which exchange a corporate bond will be listed on, or whether it will be listed or not, may affect marketability of the bond. On one hand, a listed corporate bond is more attractive because of investors' expectation of easier trading and lower transaction costs. On the other hand, the fact that corporate bonds are traded largely over-the-counter among institutional investors, both in Boarmand and McEnally's work and in our observations, implies that the real value of listing act per se is minimal.
On the effect of market credit condition on interest rates of corporate bonds Brimmer (1960) gives us some good and relevant idea. The paradox of pricing process happens when interest rates are high, newly issued corporate bonds are usually offered to investors at yields substantially above those currently provided by seasoned corporate obligations of comparable quality and maturity. If credit market becomes more liquid then the differential between new and seasoned bond yields narrows appreciably and may even become negative. When facing financial turmoil in 2008, the Vietnamese economy experienced exactly this story. In September 2008, Hoang Anh Gia Lai -a major firm operating in wood processing and real estate development; also a major stock market player -issued a 2-year bond at 20.5% p.a. At that time, Vuong and Tran (2009a) report that the central bank base rate was capped at 14% p.a., which allowed the highest commercial bank lending rate to be 21%, most probably for short-term loans. In December 2008, the corporation would be happy to raise fund at 12.25% p.a. for the same maturity when the base rate declined to 8.5%.
Furthermore, while facing a commercial bank credit crunch, corporations may have to sell shortterm bonds to obtain working capital. In 2008, most issues carried a maturity of two years or three. Although there existed debentures issued by the major real estate developer Sacomreal, the nature of these issues significantly departs from a pure financing instrument since their creditors aim at asset-purchasing rights embedded in the instrument. This reality gives rise to the mismatch between terms of funds-raising and those of capital expenditure. As to issuers, it is a plus that their source of capital is somewhat assured. But the buyers may face higher risk thus request higher financial payoffs. Because borrowing costs increase, corporations may be forced to investigate other options such as bank loans. Given low the liquidity, bank lending rates keep raising. This vicious cycle probably results in an ever-rising interest rate and strengthens the dependence of corporations on banking system -the structural issue of the Vietnamese transition economy. Brimmer (1960) also argues that the greater reliance on long-term funds would be reflected in the increased flow of new corporate issues and the concomitant rise in the new issue yields.
2.2.
Relevant questions for this research In the Vietnamese economy, the market really starts with entrepreneurial activities, which have existed for long but never developed to efflorescence in the entire history. The nationwide reform program since 1986, Doi Moi, has institutionalized many constitutional and legal aspects of the sector, but financial constraints remain.
In the voluminous literature on entrepreneurship, alertness to profits hypothesis suggested by Kirzner (1973) is quite noteworthy and represents the key element in successful entrepreneurial process. This has been supported by the reality that the majority of most successful entrepreneurs in Vietnam started by nature with trading successes. Nonetheless, to develop a full-blown private sector, at some point in time, financial constraints emerge to be one of the most important issues; yet overwhelmingly challenging to solve.
While equity has always been limited, nascent state of the debt market and other venture capital funding channels is also an impediment. Relationship-based rent-seeking games that prevail in the transition economy of Vietnam further exacerbate the private SME sector's capital constraints. We may have little choice but to look into debt finance alternative as corporate bonds. The instrument has some advantages since they have become increasingly familiar with investing public (prospective bondholders) and the products could carry with them further innovation features such as embedded options of convertibility, gold-indexed or right to future physical assets (such as in the case of real estate). However, most importantly, the corporate bond option has recently been facilitated with new developments in the regulatory framework, which continues to consummate its functioning, and liquidity of secondary markets has gradually improved over time and along the course of transforming the nascent capital market to the more developed state.
Analysis of Vietnam's Corporate Bond Primary Market
The surge of Vietnamese stock markets, especially in the period of 2006-2008, resulted in increasing interests within not only business sector but also academic circle. Despite the existence of several securities market data providers, there has been, however, no data set detailing corporate bonds issues and trading. This reality may explain the vacuum of bond studies in Vietnam, both quantitative and qualitative. This research uses a unique, and perhaps, most complete, data set organized and compiled by the authors with assistance from research associate at DHV&P. 3 We would briefly describe the data set below, and then present our analyses.
3.1.
Data set We construct a data set using various sources of information, namely (i) Press releases by corporations, market-makers, and exchanges; (ii) Public media, where some details of corporate bond issues are unveiled at times; (iii) Direct interviews with reliable sources, mainly senior managers at dealers and/or issuers; and (iv) Occasionally, previous studies and reports if considered relevant.
The data set comprises of 152 corporate bond primary issues. In this study, an issue may be in one of the three states: planed, failed, or successful. In theory, a corporation usually make announcement on its ex ante intention of bond issuing before the actual date. After that day, the issuer should, and in many cases is requested to, report the result of the issue to the relevant authorities and the public. However, it is not always the case in reality. While collecting data, we face situations where corporations unveiled their issuing plan without reporting final realizations ex post. In other situations, only final issue results are reported without prior information on issuing intent from the issuer. In our data set, an issue is successful when issuer, or dealer, or authority officially reports that all or part of the bonds has been transacted successfully in the primary market.
Each entry includes fourteen fields: Name of issuer (if issuer is a listed company we use its stock trading code, except EVN for Electrics of Vietnam, HUD for Housing and Urban Development Group, MB for Military Bank, PVN for PetroVietnam, SCB for Saigon Commercial Bank, and VEC for Vietnam Expressway Corporation); Ownership (value '1' if issuer is an state-own enterprise); Listing status (value '1' if issuer is a listed company at the date of issuance); Major business industry; Year of issuance (with an issue as above-defined); Maturity; Expected and successful values of issuance; Money unit; Status of issue; Interest rates; Technical term, and Location.
The majority of corporate bonds issued in Vietnam are in local currency (the Vietnamese Dong; or in short, "VND"). There have been only seven corporate bonds issued in US Dollar, with four of which being successful, in full or in part. The data set indicates expected and successful values in USD, using average exchange rates compiled by the authors.
SOEs, this first regulation on SOE's bond issuing, indeed, paved the way for the alternative longterm debt capital market.
Over the past two decades of transition, total value of successful corporate bond issues has reached USD 4.93 billion. This number is approximately 13% of total market capitalization of Vietnam Stock Market (about USD 39 billion at the end of 2009). We, however, should note that there are 63 corporate bond issuers while the number of listed firms is 457 at the end of 2009. The overall success rate among announced bond issues has been nominally high, 113 out of 152 times. Before detailed examination of the issuers, timing pattern, industry distribution, maturity, and interest rates of issued corporate bonds in more details, the following provides a brief look at the primary market situation. Table 2 . Although stock markets have some positive effects on the bond issuing, e.g. more issues during the stock market boom times, majority of issuers are unlisted firms. When equity finance is not available, issuing debt is likely the only alternative. The slight difference between the numbers of state ownership and non-state ownership related issuers is not substantial. State run firms tend to have a higher success rate compared to their private counterparts. In addition, their amounts of funds raised via bond issues also outweigh the private-sector players, occupying 61% and 64% of the market share, respectively. The top five firms make up 28% of the number of issues, but mobilize 48% of total funds raised from bonds. Only two first tiny issues were observed in 1998 by EIS -a small private-sector Internet services firm -worth USD 0.75 million convertibles, and VILC -financial leasing JV with the state-run powerhouse Vietinbank -worth USD 0.72 million bond with 5-year maturity and 11% coupon rate in local currency.
Observing the financial performance of state-run firms brings about several insights. The lack of transparency and problems of efficiencies tend to obscure the possibility of sales of stock. The question of "who are the buyer of their shares and at what prices" could only be solved at the boom times of Vietnam Stock Market, when many international economists regarded as "investing mania," and remain a conundrum in normal days of the market. Since direct equity injection into state-run firms is getting harder over time, given budget constraints and growing concern of the congress, naturally corporate bonds have gradually become a major vehicle for long-term capital build-up for SOEs.
However, the case of Vietnam Expressway Corp (VEC) is an example that suggests the "state-run label" is not enough in the bond market, and corporate bond issue is not "one-for-all" game, even to politically backed-up firm. VEC is a state-run infrastructure firm, endowed with many pecuniary rights in developing and operating the booming highways construction industry in Vietnam's emerging economy. Nonetheless, the market has repeatedly signaled its doubt on the firm's management capacity and performance transparency. This led to repeated failures in its bond issuing attempts in a short period of time, representing a high failure rate ever. 6 Out of its six issues, three were considered complete failure, although they had all been guaranteed by the government. Even its "successful" issue -as per our data classification -in August 2009, VEC's 4-year bond with government's guarantee was only able to sell USD 0.19 million of the planned USD 29.27 million, a mediocre 0.7% of the value that the firm has wished to mobilize.
Apart from straight bonds, the phenomenon of convertibles in Vietnam's emerging market is also noticeable. These are quasi-equity instruments, which provide both streams of fixed incomes and a call option against the issuer's common stock. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante, especially when the underlying stock flies high. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflationadjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post. In our observation, convertibility in fact adds more risk to the bondholders' part in the early stage of development of bond markets in Vietnam; although some added flexibility is usually highly welcomed by many investors.
In Oldfield (2004) it appears that simple calculation of conversion value and call price is not sufficient to predict a forced conversion or redemption of corporation. When the call protection interval has expired, there are two factors could prevent a forced conversion through a call. First, issuing corporation need a credible method for financing the call. Second, call delay is a more significant threat. This is because shareholders structure may be changed if the ownership of the convertible bonds is concentrated among a few coordinated investors. Such situation, of course, requires convertible volume large enough to the amount of stock outstanding. In the case of Vietnam's emerging corporate market, the high failure rate of corporate bond with convertible options reflect the fundamental axiom of choice by the market participants. We will not deny the fact that the equity market has attracted an increasing public attention in Vietnam since its first boom in 2005; and this is why the convertible bonds in many issues became market's favorite. Nonetheless, the real value only appears when issuing firms prove themselves to be profitable operations and growth opportunities promise adequate payoffs in the future. From our data set, Vietinbank (VCG), Vietcombank (VCB) and Saigon Securities Inc. (SSI) are typical examples of successful convertibles, while EIS and Viet A Bank failed to meet market's expectation on their issues of convertibles.
In 2007, VCG issued successfully a large amount of 3-year convertible bonds worth USD 62.01 million, at 3% annual coupon rate in local currency; and we should note that Vietnam's inflation in 2007, approximated by average annualized CPI, reached 8.3%. Also in this year, the foreigninveted IFS listed on HOSE failed to issue its USD 15.5 million lot of 3-year bonds with a much higher coupon rate, 9.6% p.a. This same year, USD 12.4 million of 2-year bond issued by Vinashin sold out at 8.9% rate. Before that 100% of VCB's USD 86.29 million 7-year convertibles were sold out with 6% coupon, while Song Da Corp., a major SOE in the lucrative real estate industry had to mobilize term finance at 9.3% and 10.5% p.a. for 3-and 5-year maturity, respectively. Clearly, what we learn from these statistics is that coupon rate or convertibility alone is not able to determine the fate of a corporate issue.
Investors
From another angle of analysis, the number of players in primary markets is critically important. The more investors are interested in corporate bonds, the less strict covenants and the lower cost of capital are. Given that large capital investment and narrow return spreads prevent individual investors from bond trading, the number of commercial banks, securities companies, financial companies, and other credit institutions involving bond transactions is a small portion to eligible financial organizations. In December 2009, there are 86 primary market members and 27 secondary market members (see Table 4 ). In terms of market trading, government bonds outweigh corporate bonds in all aspects such as number of listed bonds, volumes and values of each issue, etc. When compiling data from sources of HOSE and an active securities firm in the bond market, only 11 corporate have been listed on both HOSE and HNX stock markets. The statistics provided by the system have been far from complete and accurate, thus left outside the scope of this analysis.
We can look at Table 5 with 11 data entries to have a feel about the quality of statistics. Four out of these 11 show some contradiction. Bond coded as BID10107, BID10406 BID1_106 and BID1_206 show their debut trading before their issue date! Now, taking into consideration that HOSE has been the most established stock market operating for 10 years now, such quality of transaction information clearly suggests that the public attention to public trading of corporate bonds is negligible. Naturally, the low liquidity of the Vietnamese corporate bond market has been very much in line with theoretical suggestions by our previous review of the literature. What we could imply directly from lack of liquidity in secondary markets is inactiveness of the primary market. In many cases, dealers and market-makers, if existent at all, have to take on the holdings of the underwritten amount until maturity. This is clearly against the arbitrage-seeking motivation, and contributes to the reduction of activeness by financial intermediaries in the bond market. For this reason alone, corporate bond issuers should find it much more difficult to identify primary market buyers and almost impossible to reduce transaction costs as they wish when employing bond financing theoretically.
Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets, since only a number of large commercial banks and their securities subsidiaries dominate the total corporate bond primary market. The only way to secure the funding from bond issues for an issuer is to build close relationships with financial powerhouses that could help prearrange the required finance prior to the actual announcement of bond issues; and we clearly cannot regard this act as arm's-length transaction, since the opportunity is not equal among enterprises and does not depend on the only basis of financial viability of issuers. Apart from superficially successful cases of SOEs in the bond market, other private-sector players that have also been successful in the bond market, such as VIC, prove themselves to be in the fields where typical rent-seeking activities in a transition economy prevail.
Following the above discussion, it is not surprising that there has been little room for private SMEs to issue bonds. The structural issue in resource allocation continues to remain despite the growing size of the corporate bond market.
3.4.
Industry distribution The first four industries show a strong concentration of value, of up to 78% of total bond market value in the primary market. These industries share the properties of: (i) Monopoly, by state or nature; (ii) Having large financing need; (iii) Close link to state ownership; and, (iv) Being classified into strategic fields of development by the government. Within each industry, these four properties also determine the priority for issuers and values, with one particular example being the banking industry. We now look into these properties more closely by visiting several industries.
Banking. Three banks participating in the bond market as issuers with failure are Phuong Dong Bank (once in 2009), Sai Gon Bank (once 2008) and Viet A Bank (twice, 2008 and 2009) . Thus the effective bond finances have been allocated to 10 commercial banks, of which two largest state-run banks, BIDV and Agribank occupied 40%. Major motivations for issuing bonds are banks' solution for Asset-Liability Management (ALM) problem and growth in size. Most deposits with commercial banks have been short-term or demand ones. The psychology of depositors has been obsessed with high-inflation periods and currency devaluations that happen periodically. When the economy faces financial turmoil short-term rate usually skyrockets to adapt unexpected banking liquidity problems and flows of short-term money reflect arbitrage opportunities for many depositors.
9 However, the term financing need increases very fast, especially for real estate and infrastructure construction projects. Longer-term corporate bonds are of primary concern for banks to deal with the maturity mismatch in their ALM. The typical case is BIDV, charged with longterm funding for development projects, issue the largest amount of bond and most frequently, following its first two successful issues of 5-year bonds worth USD 75.29 in 2000. This bank issued many term bonds with maturity running from 5, 10, 15 and 20 years, and has become more active over time, with the number of issues increasing every year. Figure 4 shows the number of banks' corporate bond issues in Vietnam (both success and failure) over time. Bonds were at times used as capital cushion for state-run banks that had planned to improve their capital adequacy, but could not issue equity stock immediately, especially in the case of banks in transformation to become shareholding ones. In fact, state-run banks could use the attractiveness of bank stock, once transformed successfully, to get public funding at the cost of bondholders, such as in the case of VCB convertibles in 2006. But the market anticipation was wrong in many cases, causing loss of wealth on the part of bondholders. In the issue of VCB convertibles, the conversion happened in 2008, with stock price set at USD 6.63 each. However, this stock fell to USD 3.51 in the debut session of its listing chapter. Real estate industry shows a balance between state-run and private-sector players in terms of bond issues. However, the financial concentration in the sector does not indicate a better allocation, but a trend for rent-seeking and arbitrage in real estate markets. The value share of this industry is 16%, only below the banking industry, and four times of mining, five times of infrastructure. Land becomes a major natural and economic resources of the transition economy of Vietnam, and rent seeking in this industry is a clearly showing a strong motivation of concentration for emerging capitalists.
In this sector, we also see an innovation of the bond notion, with SacomReal debentures embedded with right to purchase real property at later date. This bond perfectly suits the speculation needs of the market. The success rate of straight bonds in this industry over 2008-09 has also been high, 85%.
3.5.
The Timing of Bonds Before 2005, only SOEs could successfully issue bonds. Both exceptions of EIS and VILC exhibit some "foreign-ownership factor". We could mark the year 2006 as starting point of non-state bond issuers to participate in this finance game, mainly coming from financial and infrastructure industries. The number of non-state players in the corporate bond market has gradually increased over time, showing more fierce competition in acquiring financial resources between state and nonstate sectors. However, although outweighing the state sector in number of firms, the number of non-state issuers in bond market surpassed that of the state sector only after 2008, as shown in Figure 6 . This gives us some important insights and changes of the Vietnamese corporate bond market in the current stage of development: (i) Market participants have done a better job with facilitating information flows within the market; (ii) Financial arrangement and underwriting capacity of financial intermediaries have improved; and, (iii) Most importantly, perhaps, corporate bonds gradually become more promising financial assets in the eye of the investing public.
Maturity
The majority of bonds offered in the marketplace carry a maturity of medium term, 2, 3 or 5 years. Our statistics show that bonds with longer maturity tend to be successful in primary market issuing; an example is the phenomenal 100% success rate of all corporate bonds with maturity of 7 years and beyond. Now, by stating this statistics we do not say that those long-term bond have been more attractive. In fact, we tend to believe that due to technical complication arising in these issues, these primary transactions involved most creditworthy capital partners and usually granted more preparatory exercises. Thus once the information is released the success has almost been guaranteed.
The reason for our belief comes from the fact that only large-scaled SOEs are able to pursue large issues with long maturity; reflected through our data set with the names of Vinashin, Vinacomin, EVN, Lilama, BIDV and VEC. The "state ownership" factor, together with an implication of government-guaranteed repayment of debts, have still had a strong influence on the psychology of investors in the bond market. Also bonds with maturity of 5 years and longer experienced high success rate. The result of our observation indicates that only a small fraction of 55 issues may experience failure. Our data indicates that the sales of long-term bonds appear not to have depended on the particular situation of the market. This leads to a better reasoning of issuing capacity that the depth of interrelationship among the issuer, institutional bondholders and underwriters may be the single most critical success factor in the Vietnamese bond market.
A case of failure and another of success by the same firm VEC in the same year can be typical and a good explanation for our aforesaid view. In the same year of 2009, VEC issued bonds twice to raise (1) USD 29.27 million from its 4-year bond; and, (2) USD 23.14 million from a much riskier 15-year bond. The less risky 4-year debt asset issue almost failed with as little as 0.7% of the sales succeeded, at a higher coupon rate of 10.5% p.a. However, it whole lot riskier 15-year bond worth USD 23.14 million was sold out at a significant reduction in coupon rate, 9%.
3.7.
Interest rate We should note one more thing on the last point. The increasing attention of the public to corporate bond started with the convertibility option, but would not likely stick to it. Varying coupon rates and variety of bond maturities have become important for larger portfolio managers to need to diversify their portfolio with some fixed income assets. In the times of turmoil, some high-yield bonds offered the best investment for investors in medium run. Table 7 shows the range of interest rates that corporate bonds in Vietnam offer their bondholders, primarily from 10 to 15% p.a. Four bonds with low rates are provided in Table 8 , mainly issued by SOEs. Whenever convertibility option is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff, such as in the case of VCG's USD 62.01 million worth of 3-year convertible bond, offered at 3% annual coupon. Given the range of inflation in Vietnam running from annual 6 to 12%, most bonds carry an annual payment of 8% or above, except convertibles and some bonds offered in US Dollars.
Coupon rates vary between different groups of issuers, and depend on the inflation trend in the economy. The year 2008 showed wide varying bond rates and serious liquidity problems among corporate bonds when the credit crunch was getting serious and banking rates exploded (Vuong and Tran 2009). In the times of continuous base rate adjustments, most of corporate bond issues failed. In times of liquidity shortage, corporate bond interest loses its attraction, even if issuer proves itself highly financially viable and the rate is substantially higher than normal standard. It is because investors are not ready for holdings of longer-term debt asset, and tend to seek arbitrage opportunities appearing in the financial market. The case of highly regarded real estate firm Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAG on HOSE) suggested that, given a very high 21% annual coupon rate for a 3-year maturity the firm still failed to obtain the debt finance via bond issues. 
Insights and Implications for Vietnam's Corporate Bond Market
We now reach some implications drawn upon the analysis of the Vietnamese corporate bond market.
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4.1. Economic variables and the bond market performance Interest rates on the corporate bond markets could easily be distorted by the influences from the state ownership in larger firms and the speculators in speculative markets, such as equity exchange. Over the sample of observation, most of the times, bond prices rarely reflected the supply-demand equilibrium. Risk consideration by market participants has thus far been distorted by rent-seeking forces available in the marketplace; leading to the reality that riskier asset may show up with lower financial compensation. The VEC 4-year bond at 16% p.a. in comparison with HAG 2-year bond at 20.5% p.a., both issued in 2008, could be indicative.
The State also represents a force in the marketplace since it could reduce SOEs' bond risk substantially; hence, interest rate. In fact, in the secondary market for corporate bonds, all 11 listed assets belong to leading state-run firms, PVN, EVN, VEC and BIDV. The structural issue of the long-term debt market would likely remain if the State continues to guarantee large SOEs' borrowings. However, the government also faces a dilemma since poor-performing would likely need more debt finance via bond issuing. But guaranteeing these issues would subsequently lead to a gradual degrading of the State's financial credibility by itself. In fact, State's guarantee in capital markets such as bonds would tend to cause negative impacts on their path of development. On one hand, structural issues and inequality widen. One the other hand, it serves to be a kind of financial subsidy that destroy motivations of many bond market participants, including the subsidized ones (since guaranteed issuers would soon reach their debt limits and still find no motivation for improving their financial performance.)
The observation from our sample also provides another insight that the State not only intervenes in the bond market with its powerful budget and policies, but also competes directly with enterprises, from time to time; and this is a typical contradiction of a centrally planned economy in transition like Vietnam. Figure 8 shows the shares of different types of bonds in the economy where the government bonds clearly outweigh the rest. Mises ( 1949) and Klein (1999) argue that just focusing on production and pricing decisions within a given structure of capital means ignoring the vital role of capital markets. As to Mises (1949, pp. 698-715) , the mission of a market system is not the pricing of consumer goods but allocating financial capital among different industries. A well-functioning capital market, that is allocating resource efficiently, would facilitate economic growth. To this end, state intervention and competition in corporate bond markets should be reduced. Otherwise, non-market and noncompetitive rent-seeking would exacerbate the problem of resource misallocation.
4.2.
Investment psychology Investment psychology has become one of the most important factors that drive the financial markets in Vietnam today. However, investors' sentiment has strongly be influenced by "herd mentality" as has been proved statistically by the stock market (Farber et al. 2006; Vuong and Pham: 2009) . The psychology could produce a profound impact on the corporate market. The majority of individual investors do not pay attention to the corporate bonds since they would mainly seek capital appreciation with the philosophy "The riskier, the higher return". Liquidity of bonds is thus a problem not only with corporate sector, but also government debt. In the past, when liquidity almost ceased to exist, bondholders found way to "improve" their liquidity by using illiquid government (then compulsory) bonds as if they were cash in wedding ceremonies, where invited guests were supposed to provide just-married couple with some "cheers money" (Figure 11 ).
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In the primary market, almost all announcements of corporate bond issue in Vietnam provide no information about listing plan. Only a handful of international issues of Vietnamese corporate bonds announce their listing schedules. It seems that issuing results have been arranged between issuers and market makers before the issuance goes to public. This characteristic of corporate bond primary market may result from relationship-based business culture in Confucian society of Vietnam (Vuong and Tran, 2009b) . There a limited number of commercial banks and securities companies dealing corporate bond. Only corporations that possess "trustworthy" track records or established relationship with dealers are able to issue bonds. This rent-seeking behavior explains why most bond issuers are large and popular corporations. However, the dominance of large issuers may indicate misallocation and inefficiency of resources. If large corporations take full advantages of government support, bank credit, equity offerings and debt financing then financial resources for entrepreneurs and SMEs are obviously exhausted. The long-standing structural problem of the Vietnamese banking system is not phenomenal but quite universal in the overall financial system (Vuong and Pham, 2009).
4.3.
On the entrepreneurship development SMEs and entrepreneurs are increasing their important role in the transition economy of Vietnam (Vuong: 1998c, and Vuong and Pham: 2009) . Equivalently, their demand for capital increases from millions US Dollars (Vuong: 1997a) to tens of, even hundred of millions US Dollars (Vuong and Pham: 2009) . Such capital need could be fulfilled by equity and debt offerings. M&A is a financing source for SMEs but not a substitution of long-term debts because of its equity nature. Moreover, Vuong et al. (2009c) reveals that the development of Vietnamese entrepreneurship should not rely on this financial channel. To this end, corporate bond can be of help.
In the case of Vietnam's emerging market, where the majority of non-state firms have been classified into privately-run or joint-stock SMEs, the inquiry into the entrepreneurial nature of bond as a debt financing option may well be relevant. A claw-back term, as described by Goyal et al. (1998) , enables private corporations to redistribute their wealth better among their shareholders and bondholders, given the fact that informational asymmetries may cause the problem of undervaluation of corporate owners. In start-up stage, capital input is so essential that "expensive" debts are accepted. Then in expansion stage, with increase in production and prices, equity offerings, particularly initial public offerings, make the corporations wealthier. The prices of their equity are higher. Thus creative entrepreneurs take the opportunity to reduce cost of capital by using proceeds obtained from equity offerings to redeem expensive debts. By this claw-back mechanism, the liquidity of corporate bond market may also improve a great deal, the reality that we wish to see in the path of debt market development. When more issuers are ready to pay higher interest rates since they still have chance to reschedule and reduce debt payments in future, an increasing number of investors would likely pay attention to risky corporate bonds, for example, backed by intangible and illiquid assets, because of both higher interest rates and sooner repayments.
Our data analyses, however, show that bond issuing is not a realistic financing option for entrepreneurial enterprises, particularly at their early stage. Corporate bond issuers, both state and non-stand, are large and popular corporations who are able to build close and trustworthy relationships with market dealers and institutional investors. The structural problem is that those issuers have already received capital through various channels, from state subsidies and transfers to favorable commercial bank credit, and high price equities. If they dominate also the corporate bond market then there is little chance for newly-born and small-scale corporations. Meanwhile their efficiencies of performance are still questionable.
Bond issuing of SOEs or privatized SOE even worsens the situation. Managements of the issuers may abuse their advantages to mobilize as much as possible fund. Then they use such financial resource to create a business growth at low level of efficiency, for example, waste investment and high agency costs. Vinashin is a typical case. The corporation absorbed USD 660.60 million corporate bonds in [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , plus a transfer of USD 750 million from government international bond in 2005. But it has been in serious debt troubles in 2009. In this case, the 'convertible term' which usually attracts attention of investors may provide management with a comfortable solution. That is converting debt into equity. The losses will be distributed over bondholders (now become shareholders) and existing shareholders, the State as well as institutional and individual investors.
The dominance of SOEs and large corporations in corporate bond market could be considered of monopolistic nature under the analytical framework of Hayek (1948) and Kirzner (1973) . When demand curve is not perfectly elastic, it is difficult to distinguish a rent-seeking from a profitseeking activity. But both activities result in higher transaction cost which eliminates SMEs and entrepreneurs from the list of bond issuers.
Closing Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed various aspects of corporate bond markets in Vietnam's transitional economy. Despite of its early appearance in 1992-1994, corporate bond is still not a popular financial vehicle to Vietnamese business community. Frequency and size of issues kept rising since 2006, in line with the surge of Vietnam's Stock Market.
The large SOEs, for example EVN, BIDV, PVN, and Vinashin to name a few, came first in exploring the bond market capacity. The most active bond issuers are in the industries characterized by (i) monopoly, by state or by nature, (ii) having large financing need; (iii) close link to state ownership, and (iv) being defined as strategic fields of development by the government. In addition, state-run firms tend to have a higher success rate of bond issuing in comparison with their private counterparts.
Our observation unveils that the State not only intervenes in the bond market with its powerful budget and policies, but also competes directly with enterprises, from time to time. The dominance of SOEs and large corporations in corporate bond market also prevents SMEs from this debt financing option.
Convertibility option raises public attention to corporate bond. Whenever a convertible term is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff. But they would not likely stick to it. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante, especially when the underlying stock flies high. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflation-adjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post.
Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets, since only a number of large commercial banks and their securities subsidiaries dominate the total corporate bond primary market. For the corporate bonds to really work, they critically need a higher level of liquidity to become truly tradable financial assets. The standards for financial reports that a prospectus must follow are specified as audited balance sheet, statement of income and statement of cash flows for the year of issue, with full account of explanations for material information/data presented in the reports. During the life of such bond, these statements must be disclosed for every financial year ending December, before March 1.
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After the registration of information and data is made appropriately, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam then appraises and approves the sale. This is the prerequisite for any realworld distribution of bonds to investors, following Article 21 of the Law. The article stipulates that distribution of bonds could only be made after the issuing firm can guarantee that prospective investors have full access to the prospectus for the planned issue. This distribution must be done within 90 days from the date of approval for issuing by the authority, with one-time extension limit of 30 days. Details of the sales must be filed with the authority within 10 days after completion, with a confirmation by banker where the embargoed account for sales proceeds is maintained. 
